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ABSTRACT

Many theorists have argued that western Christianity and Islam affect political culture in different ways, and that western Christianity is more conducive to the rise of a democratic culture than is Islam. This paper argues that the difference between Christianity and Islam in terms of the type of political culture they encourage, is largely exaggerated. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the paper finds a significant correlation between religious diversity and democratization. It develops an argument to explain the correlation and test it on the results of a survey of Roman Catholics and Muslims in Kenya conducted during 2002. The paper finds that the effect of religious involvement on political actions and attitudes depends less on whether an individual is a Catholic or a Muslim than on where an individual is a Catholic or a Muslim. It finds that Roman Catholics and Muslims who are more religiously involved in the most religiously diverse settings are more politically active and supportive of democracy than Roman Catholics and Muslims who are just as religiously involved in less religiously diverse settings. It finds that, in religiously diverse settings, religious involvement is often a more powerful predictor of political actions and attitudes than other factors usually thought to be more important, such as gender, age, education, and income. Appended is the survey questionnaire. (Contains a 125 references, 26 notes, and 15 tables.) (Author/BT)

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Christianity, Islam and Political Culture: Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT

Many theorists have argued that Western Christianity and Islam affect political culture in different ways, and that Western Christianity is more conducive to the rise of a democratic political culture than Islam. In this dissertation, I argue that the difference between Christianity and Islam in terms of the type of political culture they encourage is largely exaggerated. In sub-Saharan Africa, I find a significant correlation between religious diversity and democratization. I develop an argument to explain the correlation and test it on the results of a survey of Roman Catholics and Muslims in Kenya conducted during 2002. I find that the effect of religious involvement on political actions and attitudes depends less on *whether* one is a Catholic or a Muslim than on *where* one is a Catholic or a Muslim. I find that Roman Catholics and Muslims who are more religiously involved in the most religiously diverse settings are more politically active and supportive of democracy than Roman Catholics and Muslims who are just as religiously involved in less religiously diverse settings. Even more strikingly, I find that, in religiously diverse settings, religious involvement is often a more powerful predictor of political actions and attitudes than other factors usually thought to be more important, such as gender, age, education and income.

WORK-IN-PROGRESS

This is a preliminary draft of paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 2003, Philadelphia, PA.

The Conventional Wisdom

According to what I call the conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between religious institutions and political culture, certain religious institutions are, by their very nature, more compatible with and conducive to democracy than others. For example, the

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conventional wisdom led analysts to draw a distinction between the social, economic and political effects of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism and to draw a distinction between the social, economic and political effects of Western Christianity in general and the world's other great religions, especially Islam.

Few if any theorists continue to argue that Catholicism is less compatible with democracy than Protestantism. However, for the very same reasons that theorists did argue that Roman Catholicism was less compatible with democracy than Protestantism, theorists do continue to argue that Islam is less compatible with and conducive to democracy than Western Christianity.[1]

Crone (1980; 1986), Pipes (1983) and Hall (1985) are among the theorists who argue that Islam is essentially an obstacle to stable government, let alone democracy. They argue that Islam is unique in that it refuses to legitimize any authority other than religious authority. This has not only made the state in Islamic countries unstable, but it has obstructed the development of "civil society" and democracy (Hall 1985: 102). According to Huntington (1996: 70), it is the refusal of Islam to legitimize any authority except for religious authority that distinguishes Islam from Western Christianity and makes Islam less compatible with and conducive to democracy than Western Christianity.

[1] It should be noted that theorists not only contend that Islam is less conducive to democracy than Western Christianity, but that other world religions are less conducive to democracy than Western Christianity as well. For example, Fukuyama (1992: 217) argues that Hinduism and Buddhism are also less conducive to democracy than Western Christianity. In the case of Hinduism, its is the result of relatively hierarchical and inegalitarian religious teachings. In the case of Buddhism, it is because Buddhism confines itself to a domain of private worship centering around the family that results in political passivity.

For Huntington, the separation of sacred and secular authority is necessary in a democracy, and it is the appreciation of that separation that distinguishes Western Christianity from the world's other major religious systems, especially Islam.[2] "God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual and temporal authority, have been a prevailing dualism in Western culture" (Ibid.). "In Islam, God is Caesar; in Confucianism Caesar is God; in orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior partner" (Ibid).

Roman Catholicism, which now recognizes the value of separation of church and state, has not always recognized it.[3] Might therefore Islam allow for the separation of sacred and secular authority at some point? Huntington argues that this is not likely. According to Huntington (1996: 162), the world's religious civilizations are increasingly unitary, conflictual and change resistant.

Kedourie (1994: 5-6) largely agrees with Huntington when arguing that "...there is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world- which are the political traditions of Islam- which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of constitutional and representative government". "The notion of the state as a specific territorial entity which is endowed with sovereignty; the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation for governmental legitimacy; the idea of representation; of elections; of

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[2] Stepan (2001) disagrees with Huntington, arguing that what is necessary for democracy is religious freeedom rather than complete separation of church and state. In many of Europe's most democratic countries, such as Britain and Norway, there have been official churches. In Germany, while there is no official church, religious institutions that are recognized by the state are asissted by the state. The United States is rather unique in its strict separation of church and state.

[3] It is worth noting that Huntington never bothers to explain why the Catholic Church changed. Huntington focuses on this change as an independent variable. However, I think is very important to focus on the change in the Catholic Church as a dependent variable. It could very well be that the Catholic Church changed to adjust to a new and more religiously plural world.

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popular suffrage; of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly; of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary; the idea of the secularity of the state; are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition", writes Kedourie (Ibid.).

There is plenty of evidence that appears to support the argument that Islam is incompatible with democracy or at least that it is less compatible with democracy than Western Christianity. As Karatnycky (2002: 11) puts it, "There is a dramatic freedom gap between majority Islamic countries and the rest of the world". According to Freedom House measures, twenty years ago, there was only one "Free" country among states with a majority Islamic population, while there were 20 that were "Partly Free" and 18 "Not Free".[4] By contrast, at the close of 1981, in the rest of the world there were 50 "Free" countries, 31 "Partly Free" countries and 42 "Not Free" countries. Over a span of 20 years, the number of "Free" countries in the non-Islamic world increased by 34, the number of "Partly Free" states increased by 10, while the number of "Not Free" states declined by 22. Meanwhile, the number of "Free" countries in the Islamic world remained stuck at 1 and the number of "Partly Free" states declined by 2. The number of "Not Free" states increased by 10. Repressive regimes increased in the Islamic world just as most of the rest of the world experienced significant gains toward democracy.

[4] The categories, "Free", "Partly Free" and "Not Free" are employed by the Freedom House survey. The survey assigns each country one of the three designations by averaging their political rights and civil liberties scores. Those whose ratings are 1 to 2.5 are considered "Free". Countries that receive a 1 to 2.5 are countries that most closely satisfy the Freedom House checklist, which includes free and fair elections, free media, freedom of assembly, an independent judiciary, freedom of speech and freedom of opportunity (see Freedom House 2002: 725-726).

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The correlation between religious predominance and democracy has persisted into the twenty-first century. Huntington (1991: 73) is quick to point out that correlation does not prove causation. However, he goes on to stress the significance of the differences between Western Christianity and Islam. Western Christianity emphasizes the dignity of the individual and the separate spheres of church and state, whereas Islam emphasizes the dignity of believers as a whole and the encompassing authority of the religious sphere (Ibid.).

Thus, to summarize the conventional wisdom, those religious institutions that are themselves internally the most democratic, allow individual members more freedom and demand more responsibility of members in terms of leadership, and which do not seek a oneness with the state, are most compatible with and conducive of democracy. Thus, according to the conventional wisdom, we can expect Western Christianity to give rise to a political culture that is more compatible with and conducive of democracy than Islam.

Reason to Question the Robustness of the Conventional Wisdom

Although the positive correlation between Western Christianity and democratization and the negative correlation between Islam and democratization during the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century is indisputable, it is a leap of logic to conclude that Western Christianity is more compatible with democracy than Islam. Conclusions based on aggregate-level cross-country comparisons alone are likely to be very misleading. In other words, correlation is not causation.

Correlation amounts to no more than circumstantial evidence. There is more to a country than its religious heritage, and, in order to establish that the religious heritage of a country has had or is having a significant effect in discouraging or encouraging democracy, all other important factors must be controlled for. Besides religious heritage, economic, political, social and historical variables that are likely to affect democratization must be considered in order to determine the effect of religious heritage. There is reason to think that, at the very least, the conventional wisdom needs to be put to a more rigorous test.

Here I put the conventional wisdom to a more rigorous test on evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. I test the following hypothesis implied by the conventional wisdom, mindful that the results only provide clues as to the relationship between religious institutions and political culture:

H: All else being equal, predominantly Christian sub-Saharan African countries will have democratized more than predominantly Muslim sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2002.

How Does the Conventional Wisdom Hold Up in sub-Saharan Africa?

Generally, in sub-Saharan Africa, I do not find a correlation between the type of religious institution and democratization that would support the conventional wisdom. Instead of finding a correlation between type of religious predominance and democratization, I find a correlation between religious diversity, that is parity between Christians and Muslims, and democratization between 1990 and 2001, especially in countries that were under the

most repressive authoritarian regimes as of 1990. In other words, I find that sub-Saharan African countries that are most religiously diverse, where both Muslims and Christians are present in significant numbers tended to democratize the most. I find that those countries that are the least religiously diverse, where members of one religion predominate, whether Muslims or Christians, typically democratized the least.

Figure 1 shows that, among the countries under the most politically repressive regimes in 1990[5], predominantly Muslim countries [i.e., countries with Muslim population of over 65%] democratized relatively little between 1990 and 2002.

[Figure 1 about here]

However, as Figure 2 shows, predominantly Christian sub-Saharan African countries [i.e., countries where at least 65% of the population profess Christinaity] under the most repressive political regimes as of 1990 also democratized very little between 1990 and 2001.

[Figure 2 about here]

Perhaps most significantly, as Figure 1 taken by itself shows, the most politically repressed countries with an extremely large percentage of Muslims, over 65%, democratized relatively little, and the most politically repressed countries with an extremely small percentage of Muslims, below 20%, democratized very little as well. Among the most politically repressed countries, those with a "moderate" percentage of

[5] Countries under the most politically repressive regimes in 1990 are regimes that, according to Freedom House, were most "unfree" in 1990. These are countries that had a combined political rights and civil liberties score of at least 13, with 14 being the most "unfree" score a country could possibly be assigned and 2 being the most "free" score a country could possible be assigned.

Muslims democratized the most. Figure 2 shows that the same holds true for the percentage of Christians and democratization. Among the most politically repressed countries, those with a very large percentage of Christians, over 65%, and a very small percentage of Christians, below 20%, democratized the least. Those with a moderate percentage of Christians, between 20% and 45%, democratized the most.

The data displayed in Figures 1 and 2 suggest, but only suggest, that there is a positive relationship between religious diversity and democratization in the sub-Saharan African countries that were the most politically repressed or "unfree" as of 1990. Religious diversity is defined here not merely as the number of different religious institutions present in a country, but the proximity in size of the major religious institutions present in a country. The most religiously diverse countries are not countries with the most religious institutions present. Thus, the most religiously diverse countries are considered countries where the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who belong to different religious institutions is closest to 1 or 100%. The least religiously diverse countries are considered countries where the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who belong to different religious institutions is closest to 0 or 0%.

Before leaping to conclusions, it is important to examine data with regard to the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that were considered to be under the least political repression in 1990 according to Freedom House. These data indicate that any relationship between religious institutions and democratization depends not simply on the degree of religious diversity in a country but, to at least some extent, on how repressive a political regime is.

As shown in Figures 3 and 4, among sub-Saharan African countries that were under the least repressive regimes in 1990,there is nothing to suggest a systematic relationship between Islam or Christianity and democratization. We do not find evidence to suggest a systematic relationship between religious institutions and democratization among countries under the least repressive regimes as we do in countries that were under the most repressive regimes.

[Figure 3 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

This limited amount of data we have collected indicates not only that religious institutions are most likely to affect democratization in the most religiously diverse settings, but that religious institutions are most likely to affect democratization during the early stages of political transitions as opposed to the later stages of those transitions. This would support what others have found. For example, Phiri (2001) finds that religious institutions in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been most politicized when political rights and civil liberties were most severely limited.

Thus, I suggest that the data indicate that where and when political organizations, especially political parties, are proscribed, non-political or apolitical organizations, such as religious institutions, tend to take on the role of political organizations and are more politically influential than where and when political organizations are not proscribed. In

other words, religious institutions are most likely to be most politically influential in the most "unfree" settings and least politically influential in the most "free" settings.[6]

In order to get closer to revealing any possible causal relationship between religious diversity and democratization, we need to recognize that other variables, besides religious diversity, such as economic development, education, urbanization, and ethnic diversity, may be driving the results displayed above. It is necessary to control for these variables. We do so in an OLS regression, in which we include political repression at the outset of the transition, economic development, education, urbanization, and ethnic fractionalization, in addition to religious pluralism. Political repression at the onset of the transition is measured as the combined political rights and civil liberties score as of 1990 according to Freedom House. Economic development is measured as GDP per capita as of 1990 (World Bank 2000). Education is measured as the percent of the adult population that is literate as of 1990 (World Bank 2000). Urbanization is measured as the percent of the population dwelling in urban areas as of 1990 (World Bank 2000). Ethnic diversity is measured according to the index calculated by Alesina et al. (2002). It is calculated using the Herfindahl formula and may be translated as the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who are of different ethnic groups. Religious diversity is measured in the same way, using an index calculated by Alesina et al. (2002). It may be translated as the probability of randomly selecting members of two of three

[6] This does not mean that religious institutions are without political influence over ordinary members in the most "free" political settings. Rather, I propose that the evidence suggests that religious institutions tend to be less politically influential in the most free settings, where people are allowed to form political organizations, than in the least free settings, where people are not allowed to form political organizations.

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different religious groups [i.e., Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim] when randomly selecting two individuals.

Table 1 shows the results of the OLS regression. The results indicate that, even when controlling for repression at the onset of the political transition, economic development, education, ethnic diversity and urbanization, more religiously diverse countries typically democratized significantly more than less religiously diverse countries.

Table 1
OLS Regression Statistics for Models of Democratization
In sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2001
Dependent Variable: Democratization between 1990 and 2001

MODEL #	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
N	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
A.R. Square	.607	.561	.617	.617	.577	.590	.297
Constant	-.517 (.235)	.380 (.239)	.478 (.185)	.514 (.231)	.576 (.241)	.312 (.199)	10.787 (3.85)
Development	-.01* (.005)		-.01* (.005)	-.01* (.005)	-.01* (.005)	-.01* (.005)	.02* (.001)
Education	-.01	-.02		-.02	-.01	.07	-.02

	(.004)	(.002)		(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.030)
Urbanization	.08 (.252)	-.02 (.265)	.04 (.195)		.08 (.258)	.03 (.225)	-.02 (.054)
Ethnic Diversity	.25* (.134)	.26* (.141)	.25* (.131)	.25* (.130)		.29* (.135)	.04 (.028)
Repression	-.02 (.002)	-.03 (.002)	-.02 (.002)	-.02 (.002)	-.03* (.002)		.95** (.240)
Religious Diversity	.10*** (.022)	.10*** (.024)	.10*** (.022)	.10*** (.022)	.13*** (.018)	.09*** (.022)	

* statistically significant at the .05 level in two-tailed test
** statistically significant at the .01 level in two-tailed test
*** statistically significant at the .001 level in two-tailed test

Note: Democratization defined as combined change in political rights and civil liberties scores between 1990 and 2001, as calculated by Freedom House (2002). Standard error in parentheses.

With the exception of ethnic diversity[7], religious diversity is shown to consistently have the most substantive and statistically significant positive relationship with democratization of the variables included in Table 1. For every 1-point increase in the religious diversity index, the combined political rights and civil liberties score typically increased by an average of .10. In other words, for every 10% increase in the likelihood of selecting members of two of three different religious groups [i.e., Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim] when randomly selecting two individuals, the political rights and civil liberties score typically increased by 1 point toward "free".

[7] Ethnic pluralism has a consistently positive relationship with democratization, which may come as a surprise to many. However, as Horowitz (1985) argues, when there are numerous sizeable groups, ethnic divisions tend to be less politically salient or at least there is a greater likelihood of cross-ethnic coalitions. Where there are two major ethnic groups, the chances are much greater that the ethnic division becomes political salient and inter-ethnic tensions lead to zero-sum politics and authoritarian rule. The case of Rwanda is a case in point; an extreme example. Where there are at least three sizeable ethnic groups, the political salience of the ethnic divisions are likely to diminish.

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Further, religious diversity is shown to add significant explanatory power to models intended to explain variation in democratization. When religious diversity is included in a model intended to account for variation in democratization, the explanatory power of the model increases by at least 26%, the difference between the adjusted R-Square in Model II and Model VII. When religious diversity is included with all the other variables, as in Model I, roughly 61% of the variation in democratization is explained, as indicated by the adjusted R-square. When all the variables are included except religious diversity, as in Model VII, less than 30% of the variation in democratization is explained, as indicated by the adjusted R-square. In other words, the explanatory power decreases by half when religious diversity is left out of the model.

Thus, the evidence indicates that, rather than a systematic relationship between the type of religious system that predominates in a country and democratization, there is a rather strong relationship between the extent to which there is religious diversity in a country and democratization. Sub-Saharan African countries where Christianity and Islam are both significantly present typically democratized more than countries where only Christianity or Islam is significantly present.

Further, and perhaps most strikingly, the results indicate that religious diversity is a more powerful explanatory variable than most of the variables often thought to be more important in explaining democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. As indicated by the adjusted R-Squares, between 1990 and 2002, variation in religious pluralism explains more variation in democratization in the region than economic development, ethnic

diversity, political repression as of 1990, urbanization, and education, the next most powerful explanatory variables in descending order.

The question is, then, why is there such a significant positive relationship between religious diversity and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa? What is the causal mechanism? If there is something about a religiously diverse country that makes it more likely to democratize or democratize more quickly than a religiously homogenous country, what is it? I propose an answer to this question in the next section.

The Religious Competition Argument

In this section, I present an argument to explain the positive relationship I observe between religious divesrity and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. I call this argument the 'religious competition argument'.

Hypothesis #1: ***Religious leaders will tend to be most encouraging of political participation in the most religiously diverse settings and least encouraging of political participation in the least religiously diverse settings.***

The fundamental assumption at the foundation of the religious competition argument is that religious institutions are devoted to expanding in terms of membership and in terms of influence over the wider society. It is important to recognize that not every religious institution is devoted to expanding or influencing the wider society. For example, in the United States, the Amish people, a Christian group, believe that it is more important to be faithful than to be expansive and influential. However, the vast majority of Christian and

Muslim denominations do seek to maximize membership and influence over the wider society. These religions are devoted to spreading particular beliefs, norms and values. Thus, I assume that there are two inter-related yet distinct dimensions to the competition that takes place between religious institutions. Religious institutions compete for members and for influence over the wider society.

All else equal, where only one religious institution is clearly dominant, leaders of that religious institution need not work as hard at retaining or expanding membership and influencing the wider society. However, where at least one other major religious is present in significant numbers, leaders of a religious institution must work harder to retain or expand membership and to maintain or increase influence over the wider society (see Iannaccone 1991; Stark 1992; Gill 1998). This is because, where there is more than one religious institution, individuals are presented with a choice in terms of religious affiliation that is largely absent where there is clearly only one dominant religious institution.[8]

All else equal, the leader of a religious institution that is clearly dominant has less incentive to encourage members to engage in political action. Exceptions to this might be when the state in which the clearly dominant religious institution is situated is hostile

[8] See Albert Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (1970). Hirschman explores why people do or do not abandon organizations. Hirschman argues that people tend to abandon organizations when there are other organizations that might meet the same needs that the organization to which they had once belonged had presumably met at one time. When there are no organizations that are even remotely similar to the organization with which people have become dissatisfied, people are likely to spend their energy trying to change and improve the brand or organization with which they have become dissatisfied.

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toward the religious institution, such as in Poland under Communism.[9] Under these circumstances, we can expect that leaders of a clearly dominant religious institution do have an incentive to encourage members to political action. Assuming a less hostile relationship between the religious institution and the state, we can expect leaders of a religious institution that is clearly dominant to be less encouraging of political action than leaders of a religious institution that is not so clearly dominant.

The leader of a religious institution that is locked in competition with another religious institution, especially a religious institution espousing very different beliefs, norms and values, has a greater incentive to encourage members to engage in political action. This is because a religious institution that is locked in competition with another religious institution, especially one that espouses very different beliefs, norms and values, is in greater danger of losing members and influence over the wider society than a religious institution that is not. Leaders of a religious institution that is locked in competition with another religious institution usually must exert more effort to make sure that the 'voice' of the religious institution they lead is heard by politicians. This would be especially important for religious leaders during periods of regime change, when the relationship between religious institutions and the state may be renegotiated.[10] Religious leaders want

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[9] During Communist rule in Poland, the Catholic Church, to which 90% of the population professed membership since at least World War II (see Barrett 2001), clearly had an incentive to encourage people to political action because of the regime's attempt to eliminate the Church. For more on the Catholic Church and the state in Poland, see Mach's essay, "The Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Dynamics of Social Identity in Polish Society", in *Religion and Politics: East-West Contrasts from Contemporary Europe*, edited by Inglis, Mach and Mazanek (Dublin: University College Dublin Press).

[10] This is why it is very likely that religious institutions will have the greatest impact of political actions and attitudes early in a political transition rather than later. As was shown in Chapter Two, religious pluralism appeared to be most highly correlated with democratization in countries that were under the harshest authoritarian regimes as of 1990 and least correlated with democratization in countries where authoritarian regimes were least repressive as of 1990. This indicates that as political conditions stabilize and

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to ensure that the religious institutions they lead are not deprived of privileges [i.e. in terms of taxes, the provision of education or other services] or somehow disadvantaged relative to other religious institutions vis-à-vis the state.

Hypothesis #2: ***Religious leaders will also tend to be most encouraging of support for civil liberties and political rights in the most religiously diverse settings and least encouraging of support for civil liberties and political rights in the least religiously diverse settings.***

It may be easier to understand why religious competition would motivate religious leaders to encourage members to engage in political action than it is to understand why religious competition would motivate religious leaders to encourage support for political rights and civil liberties.

The logic employed is the logic of what Mancur Olson (2000) calls the 'limits of power' argument. Olson argues that when leaders of a group fear that another group may become the privileged group, we can expect leaders of such a group to use whatever influence they have to minimize the likelihood that any group becomes the privileged group. I argue that the greater the parity in terms of the number of members of religious groups, and the farther apart the religious groups are in terms of the beliefs, norms and values they espouse, the more likely leaders will use their influence to promote religious liberty.

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democratize, the political effect of religious institutions typically decreases. Part of the reason is also that, as countries democratize, political parties and other political groupings tend to assume the roles that religious institutions assumed before political parties and other political groups were allowed to exist (see Phiri 2001).

Gill (2002) captures Olson's argument very well and applies it to religious institutions when he argues that in the most religiously diverse settings, every religious institution is a minority institution. Accordingly, Gill writes, where all religious institutions are minority institutions, "all religious firms [institutions] will prefer a minimum level of religious liberty that allows all existing faiths to practice freely within reason. [This is because] imposing restrictions on one faith could potentially lead to religious conflict wherein one's own religious institution finds itself under repressive legislation" (2002: 10).

Adding to Gill's argument, I argue that it would be nearly impossible to promote religious liberty without also promoting other freedoms and liberties associated with democracy, such as freedom to form and join political parties, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech. Religious liberty is at its core freedom of conscience, freedom to believe what you want to believe without fear of discrimination. Perhaps this is why Cassanova calls religious freedom the "first freedom" and the "precondition of all modern freedoms" (1994: 40).

In sum, whether and the extent to which religious leaders encourage their members to engage in political action and to support political rights and civil liberties is largely a function of the interaction of parity and ideological distance. This is illustrated in Table 2. The more parity in terms of the percentage of members that adhere to religious institutions and the greater the ideological difference between them, the more we can expect religious leaders to encourage political action and attitudes supportive of democracy. The less parity in terms of the percentage of members that belong to religious institutions and the smaller the ideological differences between them, we can

expect religious leaders to be less encouraging of political participation and support for democracy.

Table 2
Stylized Illustration of the Religious Competition Argument

		Parity in Members	
		Balanced	Imbalanced
Ideological Difference	Great	Religious Leaders **Most** Encouraging of Political Participation and Political Rights and Civil Liberties	Religious Leaders **Moderately** Encouraging of Political Participation and Political Rights and Civil Liberties
	Small	Religious Leaders **Moderately** Encouraging of Political Participation and Political Rights and Civil Liberties	Religious Leaders **Least** Encouraging of Political Participation and Political Rights and Civil Liberties

A Test of the Religious Competition Argument

In this section, I test a hypothesis implied by the religious competition argument on the results of a survey of Roman Catholic Christians and Muslims in Kenya conducted between May and August 2002:

> **Hypothesis 1:** All else being equal, religious involvement will have a more significant and positive effect on political participation among Roman Catholics and Muslims in more religiously diverse settings of Kenya than in less religiously diverse settings of Kenya.

Before testing Hypothesis 1 [H1], I describe Kenya's religious landscape.

Kenya's Religious Landscape

While Kenya is a predominantly Christian country, with over 70% of its population professing Christianity (Barrett 2001), there is a significant Muslim population in Kenya, especially along the coast.[11] Within 25 miles of the coast, north to south, it is estimated that nearly 90% of Kenya's population is Muslim while there are significant Muslim populations in certain areas of Kenya's interior, such as Isiolo, Mumias, Homa Bay, and in most major urban areas.

Islam predates Christianity in what is today Kenya, arriving by sea along the East African coast sometime during the twelfth or thirteenth centuries (Pouwels 2000). Islam did not spread very far into the interior of what is today Kenya, but did take root along the coast (Haynes 1994).

The Portuguese introduced Christianity along what is today the Kenyan coast during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Pouwels 2000). However, Christianity failed to take root along the coast during this period and, like Islam, did not spread inland. Njoroge (1999) notes the failure of Christianity to take root during this period is probably due to the connection between the missionaries and the Portuguese force that engaged in slaving.

Therefore, the Christian wave that eventually did sweep through Kenya did not begin until the middle and later part of the nineteenth century, and did not include significant numbers of converts until the middle of the twentieth century (Baur 1990; Njoroge 1992; Isichei 1995; Sperling and Kagabo 2000). With the construction of the Uganda Railway at the dawn of the twentieth century, built to connect the coast [i.e., Mombasa] with Lake Victoria and Uganda, many Christian missions were established in the interior of what is today Kenya (Njoroge 1999).

The Imperial British East Africa Company [IBEAC], given a charter from the British Crown, administered what is today Kenya from 1888 until 1920, when Kenya became a British colony and the coast became a protectorate. Both IBEAC administrators and colonial officials welcomed Christian missionaries of all major denominations, not just those of the Church of England, in their efforts to reduce resistance to their rule (Oliver 1965).

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[11] Oded (2000) estimates that the total percentage of Muslims in Kenya to be 20%. However, I prefer to use the more conservative and more common estimate of between 7% and 15%. Oded's estimate is higher

Although interdenominational competition between Christian missionary groups, such as that which developed between Catholics and Presbyterians, prompted British administrators to carve territory into Catholic and Protestant spheres (Njoroge 1999), Christians were not prevented from establishing missions in areas where Muslims were present (Sperling and Kagabo 2000; Alpers 2000). In the same way, Muslims were not prevented by the British administrators from moving about and establishing mosques in the interior of the country where the most successful Christian missions were present (Sperling and Kagabo 2000).

Thus, although the coastal strip of Kenya is predominantly Muslim, Christian communities are found along the coast today. Although the interior of Kenya is predominantly Christian, Muslim communities are found in the interior, in areas such as Isiolo, Mumias, Homa Bay, and in the most urban areas, such as Nairobi, Nakuru and Kisumu.

Thus, according to the religious competition argument, we can expect that religious involvement will have a more significant and positive impact on political participation and belief in democracy among Catholics along the coast than among Catholics in the interior of Kenya. In the same way, according to the religious competition argument, we can expect that religious involvement will have a more significant and positive impact on political participation and belief in democracy among Muslims in the interior of the country than among Muslims along the coast.

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than most estimates.

Results

As Table 3 shows, religious involvement has a much more significant and positive impact on the probability that a coast Catholic voted in the last general election than on the chances that an inland Catholic would have done the same. As table 3 shows, a coast Catholic who is more religiously involved is twice as likely to have voted in 1997 than a coast Catholic who is less religiously involved.

Table 3

Voter Turnout among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: Of those who were of voting age in 1997, an answer of "YES" to the question, "Were you able to vote in the last general election of 1997?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-.2085	-.763
GENDER	.41	.83
Standard Error	(.377)	(.537)
Odds Multiplier		1.30
AGE	.99	.42
Standard Error	(.226)	(.382)
Odds Multiplier	1.50	
EDUCATION	-.73	-.37
Standard Error	(.469)	(.696)
Odds Muliplier	-.4	
INCOME	.22	-.35
Standard Error	(.210)	(.339)
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	.69	1.10
Standard Error	(.222)	(.350)
Odds Multiplier	.90	2.00
N	225	121
Percent Correct	63.6	71.7
-2 log likelihood	176.5	95.447
df	5	5
Sig (P/LR=0)	0.00	0.015

Most strikingly, religious involvement is the most significant predictor of whether a coast Catholic voted. Religious involvement is more significant than gender, age, education, and income, variables usually thought to affect political participation.

On the other hand, Religious involvement is an insignificant predictor of whether an inland Catholic voted. Instead of religious involvement, the most significant predictor of whether an inland Catholic voted is age. An older inland Catholic, that is, over 40 years of age, is 1.5 times more likely to have voted than a younger inland Catholic, that is, less than 40 years of age, who was of voting age in 1997.

As in every one of the logistical regressions presented in this dissertation, ethnic identity proves an insignificant predictor.[12] Because including the results for each ethnic group would not only be superfluous, but quite cumbersome, I have chosen not to display the regressions that include ethnic identity.

If H1 were true, we would expect to find that religious involvement has a more significant and positive impact on voter turnout among Muslims in the Kibera vicinity, who from here on out will be referred to most of the time as inland Muslims, than among Muslims in Mombasa, who from here on out will be referred to most of the time as coast Muslims. This is because, in Kibera, Muslims and Christians are present in significant number whereas, in Mombasa, Muslims are the vast majority of the population. In short,

[12] In Machakos most Catholics called themselves Wakamba [81%]. In Meru, most called themsleves Meru [90%]or Kikuyu [9%]. In Nakuru most called themselves Kikuyu [70%]. In Kisumu, almost all called themselves Luo [85%]. Along the coast, most Catholics are of ethnic groups that are found in much larger

for Muslims, religious involvement should matter more inland and less at the coast for explaining variation in voter turnout.

The results are also basically supportive of the hypothesis. As Table 4 indicates, religious involvement tends to have a much more significant impact on the probability that an inland Muslim voted than on the chances a coast Muslim would have done the same.

As Table 4 shows, an inland Muslim who is more religiously involved is 7 times more likely to have voted in 1997 than an inland Muslim who is less religiously involved. Although being a male is also a significant predictor of whether one voted in 1997, with men being more than 5 times more likely to have voted than women, religious involvement is the most significant predictor of whether an inland Muslim voted; more significant than gender, age, education and income.

Table 4
Voter Turnout among Muslims in Kenya
(Logistical Regression)

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numbers in the interior of the country. Most coast Catholics called themselves either Luhya [22%], Wakamba [19%], Kikuyu [16%]or Luo [15%].

Dependent Variable: Of those who were of voting age in 1997, an answer of "YES" to the question, "Were you able to vote in the last general election of 1997?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-3.572	-5.487
GENDER	1.76	1.51
Standard Error	(.953)	(1.323)
Odds Multiplier	5.79	
AGE	.438	1.77
Standard Error	(.633)	(.696)
Odds Multiplier		5.87
EDUCATION	-.653	-.12
Standard Error	(.908)	(1.137)
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	.70	.13
Standard Error	(.543)	(.443)
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	1.96	1.62
Standard Error	(2.196)	(1.280)
Odds Multiplier	7.07	
N	106	101
Percent Correct	65.2	78.4
df	5	5
Sig (P/LR=0)	0.001	0.000

While a coast Muslim who is more religiously involved is also more likely to have voted in 1997 than a coast Muslim who is less religiously involved, religious involvement on the coast proved not to be statistically significant and, therefore, no odds multiplier is displayed. Instead of religious involvement, age proves to be the most significant predictor of whether a coast Muslim voted. An older coast Muslim, that is, over 40 years of age, is over 5 times as likely to have voted in 1997 than a younger coast Muslim who was of voting age in 1997.

Further, and perhaps most strikingly, the most religiously involved inland Muslims are shown to be more likely to have voted than the most religiously involved coast Catholics. The most religiously observant Muslim in the most religiously plural settings is typically 5 times more likely to have voted than the most religiously observant Catholic in the

most religiously plural settings. This may be due to the fact that in Kenya, over all, Muslims make up a minority of the population as compared to Catholics who make up the largest single Christian denomination in the country.[13] Therefore, we might expect Islam to have a more positive effect on political participation than Christianity and, in particular, Roman Catholicism. Given the over all minority status of Islam in the country, Muslim leaders may be more encouraging of voting among Muslims than Catholic leaders are of voting among Catholics. Muslims leaders may feel that they need

to work especially hard to make sure that the "voice" of Muslims in Kenya is heard by politicians.

As in the case with Catholics, ethnic identity proves not to be a significant predictor of political participation among Muslims.[14]. Therefore, given the way displaying this data would complicate matters, I have chosen not to present the regressions that include ethnic identity.

If H1 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, coast Catholics who are more religiously involved to be more likely to attempt to contact a government official than coast Catholics who are not as religiously involved or inland Catholics who are just as

[13] As of the mid-1990s, Barrett (2001) estimates the percentage of Catholics in Kenya to be 22.3 and the percentage of Anglicans, the second largest Christian denomination in Kenya to be 21%. Barrett estimates that Muslims make up about 7% as of the mid-1990s. Oded (2000) claims the percentage of Muslims is much higher [i.e., 20%]. While the percentage may be higher, I know of no other observer of Kenya to estimate the percentage of Muslims as high as 20%. The most accurate estimate of the percentage of Muslims is probably somewhere in between 6% and 20%.

religiously involved. We would also expect inland Catholics who are more religiously involved not to be significantly more likely to try to contact a government official than inland Catholics who are less religiously involved. In other words, as far as Catholics are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining variation in the attempt to contact a government official along the coast than inland.

As Table 5 shows, religious involvement has a much more significant and positive effect on the probability that a coast Catholic tried to contact a government official than on the probability that a Catholic in the interior of the country would have done the same. Religious involvement has no effect on the probability that an inland Catholic tried to contact a government official. Instead, gender is the most powerful predictor of whether an inland Catholic tried to contact a government official. An inland Catholic who is male is 4.5 times more likely to have tried to contact a government official than an inland Catholic who is female. Income, age and education are more important for predicting whether an inland Catholic tried to contact a government official than religious involvement.

[14] Muslims in Kibera, unlike Muslims along the coast, represent a diversity of ethnic groups. We found that 32% of the Muslims called themselves Nubian, 30% Luhya, 15% Somali, 10% Luo and 5% Kikuyu.

Table 5

Efforts to Contact a Government Official among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question, "Have you ever tried to contact a government official?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-5.507	-3.360
GENDER	1.72	.37
Standard Error	(.846)	(.498)
Odds Multiplier	4.5	
AGE	.91	.41
Standard Error	(.456)	(.363)
Odds Multiplier	1.40	
EDUCATION	-.201	.205
Standard Error	(.967)	(.617)
Odds Multiplier	-0.20	
INCOME	1.08	-.27
Standard Error	(.458)	(.313)
Odds Multiplier	1.90	
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	.28	.77
Standard Error	(.281)	(.350)
Odds Multiplier		1.15
N	225	121
Percent Correct	93.6	69.5
-2 log likelihood	65.112	103.747
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.005	0.170

Religious involvement is the most powerful predictor of whether a coast Catholic tried to contact a government official. A more religiously involved coast Catholic is 1.15 times more likely to have tried to contact a government official than a coast Catholic who is less religiously involved. No other factor proved to have a significant impact.

In Mombasa, most Muslims call themselves Swahili or Digo

If H1 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims who are more religiously involved to be more likely to try to contact a government official than inland Muslims who are not as religiously involved and coast Muslims who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect Muslims who are more religiously involved along the coast will not be significantly more likely to try to contact a government official than Muslims along the coast who are less religiously involved or inland Muslims who are just as religiously involved. In other words, as far as Muslims are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining attempts to contact a government official inland than along the coast.

As Table 6 shows, although an inland Muslim who is more religiously involved is more likely to have tried to contact a government official than an inland Muslim who is less religiously involved, religious involvement does not prove to be a significant predictor. Religious involvement does not prove to be a significant factor in determining whether an inland Muslim or a coast Muslim tried to contact a government official. In fact, none of the variables proves significant.

Table 6
Efforts to Contact a Government Official among Muslims in Kenya
(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question, "Have you ever tried to contact a government official?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-2.527	-1.730
GENDER	1.40	1.0
Standard Error	(.847)	(.850)
Odds Multiplier		
AGE	.23	.39
Standard Error	(.578)	(.435)
Odds Multiplier		
EDUCATION	-.94	.43
Standard Error	(.858)	(1.450)
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	.65	.29
Standard Error	(.523)	(.336)
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	1.2	.82
Standard Error	(.947)	(1.489)
Odds Multiplier		
N	106	101
Percent Correct	84.8	74.7
-2 log likelihood	42.347	39.102
df	5	5
Sig (P/LR=0)	0.029	0.107

However, it is worth noting that, of all the variables, gender seems to matter most inland and on the coast. Male Muslims are more likely than female Muslims to have tried to contact a government official. Being male matters more than age, education, income and religious involvement. However, because of the lack of statistical significance, we are really not sure how much more likely males are to have tried to contact a government official than females or how much more gender matters than age, education, income and religious involvement.

If H1 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, coast Catholics who are more religiously involved to be more likely to plan to vote than coast Catholics who are not as religiously involved or inland Catholics who are just as religiously involved. We would

also expect inland Catholics who are more religiously involved not to be significantly more likely to try to plan to vote than inland Catholics who are less religiously involved. In other words, as far as Catholics are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining variation in plans to vote along the coast than inland.

As Table 7 shows, with respect to whether Catholics plan to vote in 2002, religious involvement matters more inland than it does along the coast, contrary to what the hypothesis implied by the religious competition argument would lead us to expect. An inland Catholic who is more religiously involved is 2.5 times more likely to plan to vote than an inland Catholic who is less religiously involved. Religious involvement is the most powerful predictor of whether an inland Catholic plans to vote.

Table 7

Plans to Vote in Next General Election among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you plan to vote in Kenya's next general election [2002]?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-.067	-2.870
GENDER	.66	1.07
Standard Error	(.450)	(.671)
Odds Multiplier	0.90	0.793
AGE	.07	.79
Standard error	(.254)	(.448)
Odds Multiplier		1.20
EDUCATION	-.77	1.02
Standard Error	(.586)	(.706)
Odds Multiplier	0.40	1.70
INCOME	.354	-.382
Standard Error	(.260)	(.387)
Odds Multiplier	0.40	
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	1.28	.83
Standard Error	(.278)	(.278)
Odds Multiplier	2.5	1.2

N	225	121
Percent Correct	81.5	85.3
-2 log likelihood	133.324	72.246
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0,00	0.059

A coast Catholic who is more religiously involved is 1.2 times more likely to plan to vote than a coast Catholic who is less religiously involved. However, both gender and education matter more than religious involvement for coast Catholics. A coast Catholic who is male is 1.9 times more likely to plan to vote than a coast Catholic who is female, and a coast Catholic who is more highly educated[15] is 1.7 times more likely to plan to vote than a coast Catholic who is less educated.

If H1 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims who are more religiously involved to be more likely to plan to vote than inland Muslims who are not as religiously involved and coast Muslims who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect Muslims who are more religiously involved along the coast will not be significantly more likely to plan to vote than Muslims along the coast who are less religiously involved or inland Muslims who are just as religiously involved. In other words, as far as Muslims are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining plan to vote inland than along the coast.

As Table 8 shows, religious involvement has a very significant and positive effect on whether an inland Muslim plans to vote in the 2002 Kenyan election. An inland Muslim

[15] "More highly educated" is defined as having at least attended secondary school.

who is more religiously involved is more than 6 times more likely to plan to vote than an inland Muslim who is not as religiously involved. For inland Muslims, religious involvement matters more than gender, age, education and income.

Table 8

Plans to Vote in Next General Election among Muslims in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you plan to vote in Kenya's next general election [2002]?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-1.766	-3.289
GENDER	.93	.74
Standard Error	(.924)	(1.121)
Odds Multiplier		
AGE	.64	1.31
Standard Error	(.612)	(.593)
Odds Multiplier		3.69
EDUCATION	-.89	.003
Standard Error	(.878)	(1.01)
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	.09	-.14
Standard Error	(.526)	(.387)
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	1.85	1.30
Standard Error	(.913)	(1.055)
Odds Multiplier	6.34	
N	106	101
Percent Correct	84.8	78.4
-2 log likelihood	40.538	36.408
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.002	0.014

Along the coast, religious involvement is positively related to whether a Muslim plans to vote, but not significantly so. Age proves to be the most significant predictor of whether a coast Muslim plans to vote. A coast Muslim over the age of 40 is more than 3 times more likely to plan to vote than a younger coast Muslim who is of voting age.

Further, religious involvement has a much more significant and positive effect on the probability that an inland Muslim plans to vote than on whether an coast Catholic plans to vote. More specifically, a Muslim who is most religiously involved in the most religiously diverse setting is 4 times more likely to plan to vote than a Catholic who is most religiously involved in the most religiously diverse setting.

What about attitudes concerning political rights and civil liberties? In the religious competition argument, I argue that we can expect religious involvement to have a more significant and positive effect on attitudes supportive of political rights and civil liberties in the most religiously diverse settings than in the least religiously diverse settings. In this section, I test the following hypothesis implied by the religious competition argument:

> **Hypothesis 2:** All else equal, religious involvement will have a more significant and positive effect on support for political rights and civil liberties among both Roman Catholics and Muslims in more religiously diverse settings of Kenya than in less religiously diverse settings of Kenya.

The results generally support H2. Religious involvement has a greater and more positive impact on support for more than one political party along the coast than inland. The most significant predictor of whether a coast Catholic believes it is best to have more than one political party is gender, with males being 11 times more likely to believe it is

best to have more than one party than females. However, religious involvement is the second most powerful predictor. As Table 9 shows, a coast Catholic who is more religiously involved is more than 2 times more likely to believe it is good to have more than one political party than a coast Catholic who is less religiously involved. The third most powerful predictor is income. Catholics along the coast with an average monthly income of over 5,000 Kenya Shillings [KSH 5,000] are almost 2 times more likely to believe that it is best to have more than one political party than Catholics with an income of less than KSH 5,000.[16]

Table 9

Support for More than One Political Party among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you believe it is best to have more than one political party in Kenya?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-2.355	-3.670
GENDER	1.46	2.44
Standard Error	(.486)	(.805)
Odds Multiplier	4.29	11.46
AGE	-.14	.13
Standard Error	(.225)	(.408)

[16] Between May and August 2002, when survey was concluded, KSH 5,000 was equivalent to approximately USD70.00. The average monthly income in Kenya as of 2002 was approximately USD50.00.

Odds Multiplier		3.69
EDUCATION	1.59	.74
Standard Error	(.523)	(.668)
Odds Multiplier	4.90	
INCOME	.34	.61
Standard Error	(.280)	(.347)
Odds Multiplier		1.83
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	.35	.91
Standard Error	(.268)	(.421)
Odds Multiplier		2.50
N	225	121
Percent Correct	83.8	80.0
-2 log likelihood	124.551	72.235
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.000	0.000

Religious involvement is positively related to whether an inland Catholic believes that it is best to have more than one political party, but not significantly so. Because religious involvement is not statistically significant, no odds multiplier is calculated for religious involvement. The most powerful predictor of whether an inland Catholic believes it is best to have more than one political party is education. Catholics who have at least attended secondary school are almost 5 times more likely to believe it is best to have more than one party. The second most powerful predictor is gender. An inland Catholic who is male is more than 4 times more likely to believe it is best to have more than one party than an inland Catholic who is female.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of having more than one party in Kenya than inland Muslims who are not as religiously involved and coast Muslims who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect Muslims who are more religiously involved along the coast will not be significantly more likely to support having more than one party in Kenya than Muslims along the coast who are less religiously involved or inland

Muslims who are just as religiously involved. In other words, as far as Muslims are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for more than one party inland than along the coast.

The results are also basically supportive of H2. As Table 10 shows, religious involvement tends to have a more significant impact on the probability that an inland Muslim believes that a multiparty system is best for Kenya than on the probability that a coast Muslim would believe the same. However, the most religiously involved Muslims along the coast report more support for multiparty politics than the religious competition argument would lead us to expect.

As Table 5.2 shows, religious involvement is the most powerful predictor of whether an inland Muslim believes it is best for Kenya to have more than one political party. An inland Muslim who is more religiously involved is 8 times more likely to believe that it is best to have more than one political party than an inland Muslim who is not as religiously involved. The only other variable shown to have a significant effect is age. An inland Muslim who is 40 years of age or older is 3 times more likely to believe it is best to have more than one political party in Kenya. None of the other variables prove to have a significant effect.

Table 10

Support for More than One Political Party among Muslims in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you believe it is best to have more than one political party in Kenya?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-7.287	-.928
GENDER	.80	.66
Standard Error	(.907)	(.894)
Odds Multiplier		7.67
AGE	1.11	.94
Standard Error	(.641)	(.535)
Odds Multiplier	3.05	.256
EDUCATION	1.69	-.54
Standard Error	(1.13)	(1.73)
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	.27	-.36
Standard Error	(.533)	(.394)
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	2.08	.83
Standard Error	(.991)	(1.72)
Odds Multiplier	8.067	2.50
N	106	101
Percent Correct	78.3	74.4
-2 log likelihood	40.787	36.675
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.001	0.083

The most powerful predictor of whether a coast Muslim believes it is best to have more than one political party is age, not religious involvement. As Table 10 shows, those 40 years of age and older are about 2.5 times more likely to believe it is best to have more than one party than those under 40 years of age. Religious involvement is positively related to belief in having more than one political party along the coast, but not

significantly so. None of the other variables, such as gender, education and income, proves to have a significant effect.

Further, and perhaps most strikingly, the most religiously involved inland Muslims are shown to be more likely to support having more than one political party than the most religiously involved coast Catholics. The most religiously observant Muslim in the most religiously plural settings is typically between 5 and 6 times more likely to believe that it is good for Kenya to have more than one political party than the most religiously observant Catholic in the most religiously diverse settings.

In order to ensure the robustness of our results with regard to support for a political system that includes more than one political party, we asked another question. Besides asking respondents to tell us whether they believe it is good for Kenya to have more than one party, we also asked respondents to be more explicit and to tell us which party system they think is best for Kenya.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, coast Catholics who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of a multiparty system than coast Catholics who are not as religiously involved or inland Catholics who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect inland Catholics who are more religiously involved not to be significantly more supportive of a multiparty system than inland Catholics who are less religiously involved. In other words, as far as Catholics are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for a multiparty system along the coast than inland.

The results basically support H2. As Table 11 shows, religious involvement has a more significant impact on our ability to explain why a coast Catholic believes a multiparty system is best for Kenya than our ability to explain why an inland Catholic believes the same.

While gender matters most along the coast, with a male coast Catholic being 7 times more likely to support a multiparty system than a female coast Catholic, religious involvement has the second most significant impact. A coast Catholic who is more religiously involved is more than 2 times more likely to believe that a multiparty system is best for Kenya than a coast Catholic who is less religiously involved. For Catholics along the coast, religious involvement matters more than age, education and income, in determining whether they believe in a multiparty system.

While not as significant as it is for Catholics along the coast, Table 5.3 also shows that religious involvement is also a significant predictor of support for a multiparty system among inland Catholics. Gender and education matter more than religious involvement

Table 11

Support for Multiparty System among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "Multiparty" to the question,"Which is the best political system for Kenya these days? One-party? Multiparty? No Party? Unsure? Other?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-1.783	-4.741
GENDER	1.43	2.04
Standard Error	(.397)	(.684)
Odds Multiplier	4.19	7.67

AGE	-.20	.60
Standard Error	(.214)	(.388)
Odds Multiplier		
EDUCATION	.78	.97
Standard Error	(.453)	(.634)
Odds Multiplier	2.19	
INCOME	.392	.33
Standard Error	(.225)	(.325)
Odds Multiplier	1.48	
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	.43	.85
Standard Error	(.225)	(.367)
Odds Multiplier	1.53	2.32
N	225	121
Percent Correct	79.8	77.9
-2 log likelihood	169.236	82.624
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.000	0.000

for inland Catholics. A male inland Catholic is more than 4 times more likely to believe a multiparty system is best for Kenya than a female inland Catholic. An inland Catholic who has been to at least secondary school is more than 2 times more likely to believe a multiparty system is best than an inland Catholic who has not. An inland Catholic who is more religiously involved is 1.5 times more likely to believe a multiparty system is best for Kenya than an inland Catholic who is less religiously involved.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of a multiparty system in Kenya than inland Muslims who are not as religiously involved and coast Muslims who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect Muslims who are more religiously involved along the coast will not be significantly more likely to support a multiparty system in Kenya than Muslims along the coast who are less religiously involved or inland Muslims who are just as religiously involved. In other words, as far as Muslims are concerned, we

expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for a multiparty system inland than along the coast.

The results basically support H2. Table 12 shows that religious involvement is the most powerful predictor of whether an inland Muslim believes that a multiparty political system is better for Kenya than the alternatives. An inland Muslim who is more religiously involved is more than 8 times more likely to believe that a multiparty system is best for Kenya than an inland Muslim who is not as religiously involved. The next most powerful predictor is age, with an older inland Muslim, 40 years of age or older, being more than 2 times more likely to believe that a multiparty system is best for Kenya than a younger inland Muslim. None of the other predictors, such as gender, education and income, proves significant.

Along the coast, none of the predictors proves significant. Gender, age, education, income and religious involvement do not have a perceptible effect on support for a multiparty system among Muslims along the coast. As H2 leads us to expect, religious involvement has a much more pronounced and positive effect on support for a multiparty system for inland Muslims than for coast Muslims.

Table 12

Support for Multiparty System among Muslims in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "Multiparty" to the question,"Which is the best political system for Kenya these days? One-party? Multiparty? No Party? Unsure? Other?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-5.258	.168
GENDER	.24	.14
Standard Error	(.945)	(.737)
Odds Multiplier		
AGE	1.05	-.08
Standard Error	(.623)	(.408)
Odds Multiplier	2.86	
EDUCATION	.76	-.53
Standard Error	(1.02)	(1.26)
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	.13	.06
Standard Error	(.549)	(.284)
Odds Multiplier	1.48	
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	2.14	1.26
Standard Error	(.953)	(.953)
Odds Multiplier	8.52	
N	106	101
Percent Correct	78.3	59.0
-2 log likelihood	40.046	49.360
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.002	0.906

Further, and perhaps most strikingly, the most religiously involved inland Muslims are shown to be more likely to support a multiparty system than the most religiously involved coast Catholics. The most religiously observant Muslim in the most religiously plural settings is typically between 5 and 6 times more likely to believe a multiparty system is the best type of party system for Kenya than the most religiously observant Catholic in the most religiously plural settings.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, coast Catholics who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of freedom of speech than coast Catholics

who are not as religiously involved or inland Catholics who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect inland Catholics who are more religiously involved not to be significantly more supportive of freedom of speech than inland Catholics who are less religiously involved. In other words, as far as Catholics are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for freedom of speech along the coast than inland.

With respect to support for civil liberties among Catholics, the results do not support H2, but it is important that we not reject the religious competition argument prematurely. H2 leads us to believe that religious involvement will be more significantly related to support for freedom of speech among Catholics along the coast than among Catholics inland. As Table 13 shows, this does not prove to be the case.

Table 13

Support for Freedom of Speech among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you believe that every Kenyan has the right to speak his or her mind even of he or she does not believe what we believe?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	.193	18.232
GENDER	.48	17.76
Standard Error	(.426)	
Odds Multiplier		
AGE	-.07	15.10
Standard Error	(.240)	
Odds Multiplier		

EDUCATION	.29	-15.49
Standard Error	(.512)	
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	.08	28.30
Standard Error	(.243)	
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	.47	-7.12
Standard Error	(.246)	(.953)
Odds Multiplier		
N	225	121
Percent Correct	83.8	99.9
-2 log likelihood	147.325	0000
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.320	0.050

Religious involvement does not seem to matter among coast Catholics, but this does not mean that the evidence does not support the religious competition argument at all. It is important to understand why religious involvement does not matter before dismissing the religious competition argument.

The religious competition argument leads us to expect that, all else being equal, coast Catholics will be more supportive of freedom of speech than inland Catholics. This is because, for Catholics in Kenya, the coast is a more religiously plural setting than the interior of the country. And, while the results do not indicate that variation in religious involvement matters along the coast, results do indicate that coast Catholics are more supportive of freedom of speech than inland Catholics.

Religious involvement does not matter among Catholics along the coast because there is a lack of variation in the dependent variable, belief in the freedom of speech. In other words, nearly every Catholic along the coast, 121 of 122 or 99.9%, regardless of how

involved in his or her local church, believed that "every Kenyan should have the right to speak his or her mind even if he or she does not believe what we believe".
On the other hand, only 187 of 225 or 83% of inland Catholics interviewed voiced support for freedom of speech, although religious involvement was positively related to belief in freedom of speech in a significant way.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of freedom of speech than inland Muslims who are not as religiously involved and coast Muslims who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect Muslims who are more religiously involved along the coast will not be significantly more likely to support freedom of speech than Muslims along the coast who are less religiously involved or inland Muslims who are just as religiously involved. In other words, as far as Muslims are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for freedom of speech inland than along the coast.

As in the case of Catholics, the results do not support H2 for Muslims, but, again, it is important that we not be too hasty about rejecting the applicability of the religious competition argument. H2 leads us to believe that religious involvement will be more significantly related to belief in the freedom of speech among inland Muslims than among coast Muslims. As Table 14 shows, this does not prove to be the case. Religious involvement does not seem to matter among inland Muslims, but this does not mean that the evidence does not support the religious competition argument at all.

Table 14

Support for Freedom of Speech among Muslims in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you believe that every Kenyan has the right to speak his or her mind even of he or she does not believe what we believe?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	38.923	5.372
GENDER	.36	-1.35
Standard Error	(1.687)	(1.329)
Odds Multiplier		
AGE	.83	-.10
Standard Error	(1.703)	(.798)
Odds Multiplier		
EDUCATION	2.92	-2.07
Standard Error	(2.289))	(2.248)
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	-11.04	-.85
Standard Error	(89.240)	(.676)
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	-11.80	1.408
Standard Error	(109.245)	(2.486)
Odds Multiplier		
N	106	101
Percent Correct	95.7	24.358
-2 log likelihood	8.904	0000
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.021	0.356

The religious competition argument leads us to expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims will be more supportive of freedom of speech than coast Muslims. This is because, for Muslims in Kenya, the interior is a more religiously plural setting than the

coast. And, while the results do not indicate that variation in religious involvement matters in the interior, results do indicate that inland Muslims are more supportive of freedom of speech as a group than inland Catholics.

Religious involvement does not matter among inland Muslims because there is a lack of variation in the dependent variable, belief in the freedom of speech. In other words, nearly every inland Muslim, 99 of 106 or 93%, regardless of how religiously observant, believed that every Kenyan should have the right to speak his or her mind even if he or she does not believe what 'we' believe. On the other hand, 88 of 101 or 87% of coast Muslims interviewed voiced support for freedom of speech, although religious involvement was positively related to belief in freedom of speech in a significant way.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, coast Catholics who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of freedom of association than coast Catholics who are not as religiously involved or inland Catholics who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect inland Catholics who are more religiously involved not to be significantly more supportive of freedom of association than inland Catholics who are less religiously involved. In other words, as far as Catholics are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for freedom of association along the coast than inland.

What holds true among Catholics regarding freedom of speech also holds true for Catholics regarding freedom of association. Variation in religious involvement does not explain belief in the freedom association, as Table 15 indicates. However, a much

greater percentage of Catholics along the coast voiced support for freedom of association than Catholics inland. 118 of 121 or 97.5% of coast Catholics said they believed that every group of Kenyans should have the right to meet to protect and promote their rights and defend their interests.

Table 15

Support for Freedom of Association among Catholics in Kenya

(Logistical Regression)

Dependent Variable: An answer of "YES" to the question,"Do you believe that every group of Kenyans should have the right to meet to protect and promote their beliefs and interests?"

VARIABLE	INLAND	COAST
CONSTANT	-1.67	19.232
GENDER	.58	15.76
Standard Error	(.207)	
Odds Multiplier		
AGE	-.09	15.81
Standard Error	(.207)	
Odds Multiplier		
EDUCATION	.72	-16.49
Standard Error	(.445)	
Odds Multiplier		
INCOME	-.12	29.73
Standard Error	(.208)	
Odds Multiplier		
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT	.65	-8.52
Standard Error	(.218)	
Odds Multiplier	1.92	
N	225	121
Percent Correct	78.0	100.00
-2 log likelihood	183.883	0.000
df	5	5
Sig(P/LR=0)	0.06	0.049

While religious involvement among inland Catholics proves a more significant predictor of support for the freedom of association, only 163 of 225 or 72% of inland Catholics said they believe that every group of Kenyans should have the right to meet to protect or promote their rights and interests.

If H2 were true, we would expect that, all else being equal, inland Muslims who are more religiously involved will be more supportive of freedom of association than inland Muslims who are not as religiously involved and coast Muslims who are just as religiously involved. We would also expect Muslims who are more religiously involved along the coast will not be significantly more likely to support freedom of association than Muslims along the coast who are less religiously involved or inland Muslims who are just as religiously involved. In other words, as far as Muslims are concerned, we expect religious involvement to matter and matter more positively in explaining support for freedom of association inland than along the coast.

What holds true among Muslims regarding freedom of speech also holds true for Muslims regarding freedom of association. Variation in religious involvement does not explain belief in the freedom association. However, a slightly greater percentage of inland Muslims voiced support for freedom of association than coast Muslims. Whereas 106 out of 106 or 100% of inland Muslims said they believed that every group of Kenyans should have the right to meet to protect and promote their rights and defend their interests, 97 out of 101 or 96% of coast Muslims believed the same.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have asked what effect, if any, the world's two largest faith traditions, Christianity and Islam, have on political culture. I reviewed the conventional wisdom, according to which we can expect Christianity and Islam to affect political culture

differently, and tested the conventional wisdom on aggregate-level evidence from across sub-Saharan Africa. I did not find evidence to support it. Instead of finding a correlation between Christianity or Islam and democratization, as the conventional wisdom leads us to expect, I found a significant correlation between religious diversity and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2002. Mindful that the aggregate-level cross-national evidence only provides clues as to the effect of religious institutions on political culture, I developed a causal argument, to explain the correlation between religious diversity and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, which I tested on individual-level evidence from within Kenya.

The causal argument I develop is called the religious competition argument. In the religious competition argument I propose that, in the most religiously diverse settings, religious involvement will tend to have a more significant and positive impact on participation in and support for democratic institutions than in religiously homogeneous settings. I tested the religious competition argument on the results of survey research conducted among Roman Catholic Christians and Muslims in Kenya between May and August 2002 and found that the results generally support hypotheses implied by the argument. Religious involvement had a more significant and positive effect on whether a Catholic voted, attempted to contact a government official and supported a multiparty political system in the most religiously diverse settings, settings where there are nearly as many Muslims as Catholics, than in the least religiously diverse settings, settings where there are only Catholics or other Christians. Religious involvement also had a significantly positive impact, even more positive than for Catholics, on whether a Muslim

voted, planned to vote and supported a multiparty political system, in the most religiously diverse settings, settings where there were nearly as many Christians as Muslims, than in the least religiously diverse settings, settings where the vast majority of the population is Muslim.

Contrary the religious competition argument, religious involvement had a more positive effect on whether a Catholic planned to vote in the least religiously diverse settings than in the most religiously diverse settings. The results indicate that neither Catholicism nor Islam had a significant effect on support for civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and association. However, the results indicate that neither Catholicism nor Islam discouraged support for civil liberties.

In this section, I propose three important questions, raised by the findings presented in this paper, to which further study must be devoted. These questions are: (1) How well will the religious competition argument travel across space? (2) How well will the religious competition argument travel across time? (3) How well will the religious competition argument travel across religious denomination?

How well will the religious competition argument travel across space?

As striking as the findings presented in this paper are, we are left wondering how well the religious competition argument will travel beyond Kenya and beyond sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the major conclusions of this paper is that, in order to identify the effect of religious institutions on political culture, we must do more than examine a country's religious heritage and the extent of democratization at the systemic level. We must cut below the national, systemic, level to the sub-national and individual level in order to determine the effect of religious institutions on political culture. In order to determine the effect of religious institutions on political culture, we must do more than compare individuals of one religious institution with individuals of another religious institution. We must also compare individuals within one religious institution with each other. We must compare individuals who are more religiously involved with individuals of the same religious institution who are less religiously involved in order to determine the effect of a religious institution on political culture. This is what we have done in this paper with Roman Catholics and Muslims in Kenya.

In order to determine how well the religious competition argument travels and whether and the extent to which religious diversity determines the effect of religious institutions on political culture, individual-level analysis must be conducted in other countries. Although survey research, particularly regarding highly socially desirable behavior and ideas, such as religious observances, political participation and attitudes toward civil rights and political liberties, is fraught with hazards, it is the only way to begin to discover the effect of religious institutions on political culture.

How well will the religious competition argument travel across time?

While we find that, all else being equal, religious involvement does have a significantly positive effect on the rise of a political culture conducive of democracy in the most religiously diverse settings, it must be admitted that this conclusion is based on a temporally limited body of evidence. At the aggregate level, it is based on evidence from sub-Sharan Africa between 1990 and 2002. At the individual level, it is based on the results of a survey of Roman Catholics and Muslims in Kenya that was conducted between May and August 2002. In order to understand how religious institutions affect political culture we have taken a snapshot. What we need to test the religious competition argument more thoroughly is a moving picture.

Further study must be devoted to exploring whether changes in the extent of religious diversity across time in certain settings affects the impact of religious involvement on political actions and attitudes the way the religious competition argument leads us to expect. The religious competition argument leads us to expect that, all else being equal, as a setting becomes more religiously diverse, religious involvement is more likely to have a significant impact on participation in and support for democratic institutions. As a setting becomes less religiously diverse, the religious competition argument leads us to expect that involvement in the largest religious institution is less likely to have a significant impact on participation in and support for democratic institutions. However, as a setting becomes less religiously diverse we can expect religious involvement will have a more significant impact on participation in and support for democratic institutions in the smallest religious institutions.

Further study should be devoted to tracking changes over time at both the aggregate and individual levels. Of all the regions in the world, sub-Saharan Africa's religious landscape appears to be very much in flux and, therefore, promises to teach us much more about the relationship between the religious landscape and political culture. Christianity and Islam are both growing in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Haynes 1996; Gifford 1998; Barrett 2001). Further study must be devoted to discerning whether and how the growth of Christianity relative to Islam [and vice versa] affects political change. Also, the religious landscape in many areas of Kenya is rather fluid. As in many other sub-Saharan African countries, there is a great deal of migration from rural to urban areas in Kenya.[17] Further study must be devoted to how the growth of Christianity relative to Islam [and vice versa] in certain locations affects participation in and support for democratic institutions.

There is reason to think that religious institutions have a more significant impact on political participation and attitudes toward political rights and civil liberties early in transitions from authoritarian rule rather than later in transitions from authoritarian rule. The reason is, as Phiri (2001) argues, when long-reigning autocrats and ruling parties continue to hold power, and political parties other than the ruling party are weak, religious institutions often become most politicized and operate as surrogate

[17] Although the majority of Kenyans [i.e., 70%] reside in rural areas, there has been a constant migration to urban areas that became especially pronounced during the 1980s (World Bank 2000). The urban population grew from approximately 16% in 1980 to approximately 30% in 1997 (Ibid). Any estimates are very rough estimates since many Kenyans dwell in urban areas only long enough to secure income and then return to the countryside.

political parties. However, as the power of long-reigning autocrats begins to wane and once powerful ruling parties begin to lose their grip on government, and opposition parties gain strength, religious institutions are often less politicized. Nonetheless, there has been little in the way of systematic study devoted to testing this conjecture.

Further study must be devoted to understanding whether and how changes in the quality of democracy affect the political impact of religious institutions.[18] The survey conducted in Kenya, for example, was conducted during the months prior to the 2002 general election there. Daniel arap Moi, who ruled Kenya since 1978, and the Kenya African National Union [KANU], the only party to ever be in government, continued to rule Kenya. Kenya's opposition parties appeared weak and were divided, as they had been in the previous two multiparty elections of 1992 and 1997.[19] In the presidential election of 2002, however, Moi's handpicked successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, was defeated. Mwai Kibaki was elected president and his National Rainbow Coalition [NARC] gained a majority of seats in parliament.[20] Immediately after the 2002 election, Kibaki and NARC have embarked on a highly publicized assault on corruption and commitment to democratic reforms.[21] There is widespread perception that Kenya is becoming more

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[18] The key to defining the quality of democracy in this case is the extent to which political parties represent the interests of those who affiliate with the political parties.

[19] In the previous elections of 1992 and 1997, Daniel Moi won the presidency with just 30% and 37% of the popular vote respectively (see Nohlen 1999). In both 1992 and 1997, several opposition party candidates divided the majority of the votes cast. When I conducted the survey in Kenya, the opposition still appeared to be divided. However, from the time Moi named Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU's presidential candidate, the opposition began to unify as it had not since before the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1991.

[20] NARC won 125 of 210 seats or 60% of the seats (see *Daily Nation*, January 1, 2003). At the time, NARC was not a political party but, as the name suggests, an alliance of political parties.

[21] See *Daily Nation*, February 1-15, 2003 for details. The Kibaki/NARC government has re-opened the infamous "Goldenberg Affair", in which government officials are alleged to have taken bribes and spent

democratic after ten years of what appeared to be no progress toward democracy and even democratic reversal. The question is, what effect, if any, can we expect what appears to be a democratic breakthrough in Kenya to have on the political impact of religious institutions in the country? Further study should compare the effect of religious institutions on political actions and attitudes before the 2002 election with the effect of religious institutions on political actions and attitudes after the 2002 election. Thus, another survey in Kenya is in order.

How well will the religious competition argument travel across religious denominations?

At the aggregate level, I have focused broadly on the world's two largest faith traditions, Christianity and Islam. At the individual level I have focused on Muslims, almost all of whom are Sunni Muslims, and Roman Catholic Christians in Kenya. In this paper I claim that the evidence indicates that the effect of religious institutions on political culture depends less on whether one is a Christian or Muslim than on where one is a Christian or a Muslim. However, Christianity and Islam include various denominations and sub-traditions.

Further study should be devoted to disaggregating Christianity and Islam into various denominations and sub-traditions. This is another way to more thoroughly test the claim

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state resources to finance an extravagant private project. The NARC government has also pledged itself to investigating the so-called "tribal clashes" that took place during 1992 and 1997 in the Rift Valley and the

that the impact of religious involvement on political culture depends less on whether one is of one religious institution or another than on where one is of one religious institution or another.

The number of Pentecostal Christians in many countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including Kenya, has increased dramatically over the past decade.[22] Can we expect religious diversity will affect the political impact of Pentecostalism and other Christian denominations and sects in the same way that religious diversity affects the political impact of Catholicism in Kenya?

While Pentecostalism and Catholicism are both Christian denominations, there are reasons to expect Pentecostalism to affect political culture differently than Roman Catholicism. There are also differences that may affect the extent to which the religious competition argument explains differences in political culture. Some theorists have

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Southern Coast. The Kibaki-led government has also pledged itself to constitutional reform, something the Moi/KANU government delayed.

[22] Barrett (2001) estimates that the percentage of Christians in Kenya who are Pentecostal has increased from 8%, in 1970, to nearly 27%, as of the mid-1990s. In Ghana, the percentage of Christians who call themselves Pentecostals has gone from 12% to 21% during the same period (Ibid.). In Nigeria, the percentage of Christians who are Pentecostals has gone from 7% to 31% between 1970 and the mid-1990s (Ibid.). In many Francophone African countries the growth is also dramatic. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the percentage of Christians who profess Pentecostalism grew from 22% in 1980 to over 33% as of the mid-1990s (Ibid.).

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found Pentecostal Christianity, compared to mainline Christianity, to be an escape from politics (Gifford 1998). Pentecostal and evangelicals in Kenya have often criticized leaders of other Christian churches, particularly the leaders of the Roman Catholic

Church, for being too concerned with politics (Ibid.).[23] However, it is important to recognize the impact of Pentecostal and evangelical churches on political culture is likely to be rather complex. Pentecostal and evangelical churches are generally known to be more solicitious than mainline Christian churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church (Freston 2001). If this is true, the religious competition argument leads us to expect that Pentecostal and evangelical Christianity will have an even more significant and positive impact on the rise of a political culture that is conducive of democracy than Catholicism.[24] Pentecostals are thought to be less ecumenical or tolerant of different faiths than Catholicism and mainline Christian churches, and, therefore, more willing to contest Islam where Islam is predominant than Roman Catholics and other mainline Christians (Ibid.). If this is true, it is debatable what effect this might have on the rise of a democratic political culture.

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[23] While most Christian churches proved a thorn in Moi's side and openly promoted democratization in Kenya sine at least the late 1980s, not all did. Independent Evangelical and Pentecostal churches openly endorsed Moi and the single-party system. During the early 1990s, while Moi was under considerable pressure to allow for multiparty politics, he attended the Redeemed Gospel Church, and that evening the state-owned television and radio stations carried lengthy coverage of the minister's sermon in which he preached, "In heaven, there is only one party…President Moi has been appointed by God to run the country…and Kenyans should be grateful for the peace prevailing…We have freedom of worship, what else do we need?…Some churchmen masquerading as bishops and reverends have turned into rebels and are teaching their own gospel not that of Christ…People should shut up, accept the present leadership and prepare for heaven!" (Reported in *Kenya Times*, 24 February 1992).

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It is also important to note that in many African countries, a considerable percentage of the population practice neither Christianity nor Islam. In many countries, a considerable percentage of the population continues to practice some form of ethnic religion.[25] Although the percentage is decreasing, in Benin, for example, nearly 55% of the population practiced some form of traditional ethnic religion as of the mid-1990s (Barrett 2001). In Ghana, nearly 25% of the population practiced ethnic religion as of the mid-1990s (Ibid.).

Further study should be devoted to determining whether religious diversity affects the political impact of non-Christian and non-Muslim religions in the same way that religious pluralism affects the political impact of Christianity and Islam. Because many Africans practice some elements of both ethnic religion and Christianity or Islam (Gifford 1998), it may be difficult to assess the impact of ethnic religion on political culture. Nonetheless, given the large percentage of ethno-religionists in some countries, many of which have democratized relatively quickly during the 1990s, such as Benin and Ghana, it is a topic worthy of study.

Besides testing hypotheses implied by the religious competition argument on other religious denominations, further study should also be devoted to testing hypotheses implied by the religious competition argument on other types of voluntary associations

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[24] This is because Pentecostal and evangelical Christianity tend to be more competitive. However, this competition, if driven by a lack of tolerance, might, as in the cases of Nigeria and Sudan, might mobilize without moderating.

[25] It should be noted, that many Africans practice both Christianity or Islam and traditional religions. Many people are known to practice a mixture of ethnic religion and Christianity or Islam (see Gifford 1998).

and organizations. The results reported here suggest that we should be prepared to learn that other voluntary organizations, besides religious institutions, do not always and everywhere affect political culture to the same degree or in the same way. The results reported indicate that it is nurture, and not simply nature, that determines the impact of a an organization on political culture. Perhaps, more accurately, we might interpret the results as indicating that the environment affects the nature of an organization.

The results reported here suggest that the type of political culture an organization encourages where it is the only organization or the largest organization of its type around is likely to be different than the type of political culture encouraged by an organization where it is one of many like organizations or the smallest of its type of organization around. Where there are very few voluntary associations or where the vast majority of the population belongs to one voluntary association, we can expect the impact of associational life on political actions and attitudes to be less pronounced and qualitatively different than where there are many voluntary associations or where such associations are almost equal in terms of membership.[26] Further study should be devoted to exploring whether and how the diversity of associational life affects the impact of associational life on political culture.

While there are as many questions raised in this paper as have been answered, the results indicate that religious institutions often have a significant effect on political culture and, therefore, on the legitimacy of various types of political regimes.

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[26] This would be to build on the work of Putnam (1993; 2000) who has been especially devoted to the study of the vibrancy of associational life on the quality of democracy.

In certain settings, generally the most religiously diverse settings, we have found that religious institutions have an even more significant and positive effect on the development of a political culture conducive of democracy than other factors usually thought to be most important, such as gender, age, income, education and ethnic identity. At the very least, the results reveal that if we are really to understand where and why democracy survives in some contexts and not others, we must focus more attention on voluntary institutions and organizations such as religious institutions.

Appendix: The Religion and Politics Survey Questionnaire

SECTION I: (BACKGROUND)

1. SEX: M F

2. ARE YOU MARRIED? YES NO

3. WHAT IS YOUR AGE?:_____
   (If respondent is not sure, interviewer must estimate: 18-25, 25-40, 40-60, over 60)

4. WERE YOU ABLE TO ATTEND SCHOOL? YES NO

5. WHICH SCHOOL? _____

IS IT A RELIGIOUS SCHOOL? YES NO DO NOT KNOW

6. HOW FAR WERE YOU ABLE TO GO IN SCHOOL?_____
   (highest form or standard)

7. BESIDES YOUR RELIGION, ARE YOU A MEMBER OF ANOTHER ORGANIZATION OR GROUP THAT MEETS FROM TIME TO TIME SUCH AS

   A TRADE UNION A SPORTS CLUB? A YOUTH GROUP? OTHER?_____

8. WHICH LANGUAGE IS YOUR MOTHER TONGUE?_____

9. (It is difficult to find work these days.)
HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO FIND WORK THESE DAYS? YES NO

10. IF YES, WHAT TYPE OF WORK IS IT?_____

11. ON AVERAGE HOW MANY KENYAN SHILLINGS DO YOU HAVE COMING INTO YOUR HOUSEHOLD PER MONTH AS INCOME? _____

12. DO YOU THINK KENYANS ARE BETTER OR WORSE OFF THAN THEY WERE TEN YEARS AGO OR ABOUT THE SAME? BETTER WORSE SAME

IF BETTER, WHY?_____

IF WORSE, WHY?_____

SECTION II (RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT)

13. FOR HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A MEMBER OF YOUR RELIGION?

14. HOW OFTEN DOES YOUR RELIGION CONDUCT SERVICES/PRAYERS/ MANY TIMES PER DAY, EVERY DAY ONCE PER WEEK ONCE PER MONTH LESS OFTEN

15. (Sometimes it is not possible for good people to attend services.)
WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU WERE ABLE TO ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES OR PRAYERS?_____

16. ARE YOU ABLE TO REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE LEADER OF YOUR LOCAL CONGREGATION OF MOSQUE? YES NO
IF YES< WHAT IS THE NAME?_____

17. [Roman Catholics only] (Sometimes we are not able to do everything we would like to do.)
ARE YOU ABLE TO MEET WITH A SMALL CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY?
YES NO

19. [Roman Catholics only] IF YES, WHAT IS THE NAME OF THAT SMALL CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY? _____

SECTION III (VOTING AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION)

20. (Sometimes it is not always possible for good people to go to the polls and actually vote on election day.)
WERE YOU ABLE TO VOTE ON ELECTION DAY 1997 YES NO NOT SURE

21. (Sometimes we feel frustrated that our votes do not make a difference.)
DO YOU PLAN TO VOTE IN THE NEXT ELECTION? YES NO UNDECIDED

22. HAVE YOU EVER TRIED TO CONTACT A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL?
YES NO

SECTION IV (BELIEFS POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES)

23. IN YOUR VIEW IS IT GOOD FOR A COUNTRY TO HAVE MORE THAN ONE POLITICAL PARTY? YES NO NOT SURE

24. DO YOU THINK EVERYONE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SPEAK HIS OR HER MIND IN PUBLIC, EVEN IF HE OR SHE DOES NOT BELIEVE WHAT WE BELIEVE? YES NO NOT SURE

25. DO YOU THINK EVERY GROUP OF KENYANS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MEET TO PROTEST OR PROMOTE THEIR BELIEFS AND INTERESTS?
YES NO NOT SURE

26. WHICH DO YOU THINK IS THE BEST SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT FOR KENYA THESE DAYS? ONE PARTY MULTIPARTY NOT SURE OTHER

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